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The heart of man cannot hoard. His brain or his hand
may gather into its box and hoard, but the moment the
thing has passed into the box, the heart has lost it and is
hungry again. If a man would have, it is the Giver he must
have.... There all that He makes must be free to come and
go though the heart of His child; he can enjoy it only as it
passes, can enjoy only its life, its sound, its vision, its
meaning, not itself.
— George MacDonald
oth of the term s in m y title will be fam iliar to
m any of this journal's readers. For the sake of
precision, how ever, I begin w ith definitions.
By "angels" I mean incorporeal intelligences whose nor
mal haunt is Heaven, and by "Inklings" I mean corporeal
intelligences whose normal haunt was Oxford. N ow I must
at once add, lest an angel be confused with its supra-angelical
Origin and Source, that by "incorporeal" I do not wish to
signify something simple — that is, having no body at all —
but something having no physical body; nor do I mean by
"intelligences" only minds (lest an Inkling be confused with
his infra-intelligent cousins), but minds aware of themselves,
and through themselves of what exceeds them. These quali
fications should be sufficient to exclude God from the first
category, as H e must be from all categories; and, if not
altogether to exclude from the second quite every other
Oxonian of the 1930s, '40s and '50s, at least to include as
models of their class those whom we know best as J.R.R.
Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, and Charles Williams.
Yet a further proviso is in order before proceeding, and
that is to say that having thus defined my topic, I shall
nevertheless be taking certain liberties. In fact I intend
deliberately to com plicate the m atter by exchanging the
differentiae of m y definitions; and I plan to insist that
without this com plication, one cannot possibly understand
what Inklings thought of angels. To be precise, I shall be
acting as though angels are corporeal intelligences, and as
though Inklings are o f the incorporeal variety. W hat I have
up my sleeve with regard to the first paradox will be
revealed presently. By the second I m ean to say that I shall
be referring to the work of Tolkien, Lewis, and Williams
without a single explicit reference to a place, a time, a
motive, an influence, a background, or an "- i s m " — indeed,
without the use of these nam es at all, which is perhaps what
they would have preferred. The Inklings are to be under
stood here, not as though they were m en, but only insofar
as their books, especially their fantasies, can be employed
as a kind of shorthand for certain insights into the nature
and purpose of angels, or as abbreviations for angelic ideas.
It is for m y purposes here, therefore, altogether acci
dental and irrelevant, that these ideas should have becom e

incarnate in the particular books w e find them in — nota
bly, in The Siltnarilliion, which arrived on the earth through
the agency o f Tolkien; in Perelandra, w hich was m ediated
to the m inds o f men through Lew is; and in The Place o f the
Lion, w hich is (am ong other things) the Apocalypse ac
cording to W illiam s .1 O f course, som e m ight w ish to cor
roborate the observations I m ake, and if so, they are ad
vised to exam ine the recollections o f Lew is and die incan
tations of W illiam s in particular, as w ell as the "theoreti
cal" work of the som etim es neglected Inkling Owen
Barfield, especially his early book Poetic Diction, which
strongly inform s the first part of w hat follows, ju st as it
inform ed also the work of both T olkien and Lewis.
But here the aim is quite different from corroboration
or the exam ination of texts. It is to enter O ther W orlds —
w hat Tolkien called "secondary w orlds" — so as to take
seriously w hat they can teach us about the p rim ary world
we seem to live in; and further — to borrow a distinction
from Lewis — it is to look "alo n g " and not "a t" w hat we
find in those worlds in hopes of a freshened perception .2
❖

❖

❖

Although the world o f physical phenom ena is being
known into being by God through the m ind o f H is creature
man, this creature ordinarily know s it not, b ut supposes
instead that w hat he sees b efore him , on the other side of
his skin from his brain and his heart, is a fa it accompli, a
product or result, to be m odified, not by the present active,
but by the perfect passive participle. B ecause he so seldom
looks at the mind, so as to discover w hat it actually is, this
creature has com e to assum e that the pow er o f looking is
derivative and subsequent. He approaches the w orld as a
given, and as though it possessed a solidity in com parison
with w hich his corresponding thoughts appear as little
m ore than shadows, and apart from w hich (or so it seems)
he would cease, not only to know, b ut to be. M en h ave in
this way becom e captives of w hat w ere in the first place,
and what continue to be, the creations, constructions, or
projections o f the hum an mind itself.
I say "th e" m ind, and not "th eir" m inds, for theirs on
their ow n, considered distinctly from those of other men,
and as but parts of particular egos, are quite clearly not the
cause of w hat men see. They are not the cause, b ut the
caused, and for them, for these individual m inds, the
world we find around us does and m ust rem ain a given,
the antepenultim ate source of all those associations, tenden
cies, and sensations that make a m an am ong men who he is.
But who he is and what he is are not the same. Though he be
a man as a "who," he is as a "w hat" simply man; and as such,
however much he forgets, he continues to be that channel
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created by God through which the Word might be con
sciously poured on its way in the direction of matter. Man
is meant to be no mere spectator, but an active participant
in the continuous making of sunshine and birds and trees
and m ountains— of all that exists as an object of his senses.
Three quite different, but equally pernicious, errors may
interpose themselves at this point unless we carefully and
consciously guard against them. The first consists in think
ing that the human mind, and not merely my mind, is
locked within the skull somewhere and rooted in the brain,
whereas in fact what is meant by "skull" and "brain" are
themselves the products of man's know ing— contained in
it, not it in them. If one is to understand the origin of matter,
one must not, on pain of absurdity, begin by assuming that
this origin itself is made of solid stuff. A second mistake
would be to suppose that, had the human being not been
created, the places, spaces, or positions now occupied by
chairs and tables, not to mention skulls and brains, would
have been left vacant, empty holes possessing only the
shape or outline of the contents we have made to fill them.
Whereas in fact these very "holes," together with the space
and time they presuppose, are equally our creations. The
extension and duration into which we know the objects of
our consciousness are themselves being known into being.
Finally, a third error would consist in thinking that when
we speak (as w e have) of creation by God through man, we
mean to inflate our already swollen egos, and that, whether
we mean to or not, we risk a blasphemous promotion of the
human creature above his appointed station, and beyond
the orbit of those realities that would otherwise provide this
measure. Whereas in fact what we mean is that man, strictly
dependent even at this highest level upon the facticity and
objectivity of God and G od's ideas, has been providentially
designated the intelligible means through which God
might clothe those ideas in sensible vestments.
Would there be stars and meadlowlarks and roses were it
not for the existence of man? Of course — nor could these ever
not have been. But apart from man, the glimmer of the stars
would not have been seen, for they would have had no light;
nor the songs of the meadowlarks heard, for they would have
no voice; nor the fragrance of the roses smelled, for they would
have no perfume. Man's role is that of pontifex. He is intended
to make himself a bridge and to compose materials of his
consciousness into bodily vessels for celestial truths. In order,
however, to be such a bridge — that is, to be a good one— he
must be aware of this pontifical function, and he must act in
keeping with its demands, always making in strict accordance
with the law by which he himself is made .3 He must under
stand his causal relationship to the world of colors, tones, and
textures that lies spread before him, and with which his very
muscles and bones and blood are interwoven. But in order to
understand, to know from within its exercise this power of
creativity, I as a man must first be liberated from my individual
mind's fixation on results and givens, so as then to be able to
move upstream in the river of knowing toward that knowing's
source, which is (to repeat) not mine, but the mind itself; not
ratio but intellects; not soul, but Spirit.
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In the meantim e, the consequences of my present fixa
tion are chiefly two. By acting as if the world I see were
independent of human consciousness, a world already
real in itself, 1 am in the first place blinded to the fact that
whatever has happened, and whatever shall happen, in its
deepest dim ension, is happening right now. Because the
trees and the mountains, the tables and chairs, appear to
be given, their making is thought to be past, and their
seeming solidity is allowed to displace and eclipse a creat
ing that seems no longer real. Nor can it help but follow as
a corollary of this blindness that G od — if He is believed
in at all — should also be removed from the "now ," and
placed safely at the start of a temporal series of secondary
causes, whose discontinuous moments might serve to
shield me from His present power.
A second consequence is this. By allowing my mind to
freeze and to fix the liquid and continuous creations of the
mind as such, I have compromised the original integrity of
things. What comes into the mind from G od as a whole, I
have cut and divided, my ego acting as a "half-silvered
mirror," and splitting the beam of the divine ideas. Thus
is Spirit split into body and soul, percepts and concepts,
facts and notions, things that exist apparently outside the
physical envelopes in which we live and the thoughts we
have about those things when we are safe and snug "in
here." What we call the material and the im material, or the
corporeal and incorporeal, are given by God as one, itself
neither matter nor mind, nor even both, because not in
itself susceptible to such divisive categories. But upon this
one, this whole, the ego perform s a m ost curious opera
tion. Rather than giving way to God's gift, as it was meant
to, in order that the principles of things m ight enter the
world of space and time in all their pow er and with all their
glory, the ego of man — my mind on its o w n — will permit
only their bodies to pass, which are the sensible halves of
G od's intentions, all the while hoarding their meanings,
clinging to the abstracted notions of things, and refusing
to let them go. H ence the world, the fallen world, we live
in: a world in which facts have lost their thoughts and
thoughts their facts; a world w here concepts so seldom
depend on the sounds and rhythms of the words we use
to mean them, and where the things we perceive so seldom
mean more than symbols.
❖

❖

❖

I said I need liberation. Anyone when he looks at the
world sees it as independent of that looking, and as exist
ing apart from the thoughts he thinks about it, needs
liberation. His attachments must be dissolved. His distinc
tions of then from now, and inside from out, must be
broken down. But in order that this may happen, he needs
above all to be shown that his categories do not fit and
cannot accommodate things as they really are, as they exist
in the mind of God. Such a one needs showing that those
pale abstractions that he calls his thoughts and those tepid,
tenuous, and insipid contacts with m atter that constitute
his sensory experience are as nothing when compared to
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what preceded and underlies them both. He m ust be made
to see and to tough, and not only to think, that innocence
which is the substance o f lam bs, that speed which is the
operation of horses; he m ust be shown how to think, and
not only to see or to feel, the talons of the eagle, which are
its knowledge, and the coils o f the snake, which are its
subtlety .4 O ur m an stands in need of instruction; he needs
to be given a redem ptive m essage.

an instrument than spoken from a throat; and yet the
tim bre is not m echanical either. A m achine is som ething
w e make. But the message that an angel brings, and which
it is, sounds rather as if rock or crystal had spoken of its
ow n accord. And it penetrates — say those who have
heard it — from chest to groin like the thrill that goes
through us when we think we have lost our hold while
clim bing a cliff.

But the message, if it is to do its proper work and have its
intended explosive effect, cannot be of a strictly mental sort,
lest the division of this into parts be exaggerated rather than
undone and a conceptual communication be effected at the
expense of our perceptions. The facts of our fallen life de
mand instead that the message be written in the very sub
stance, in the body, of the messenger — indeed, that the
message be the messenger, and he the message. It is essential
moreover that the m essenger's body be such as to resist our
efforts to define or explain it. For the purpose of this instruc
tion is precisely to teach us the inadequacy o f all our usual
categories— so as to compel renewed attention to the arous
ing of our drowsed souls. W e need, in a word, an angel.

N or is the visual perception o f angels any less unusual
or disturbing. W hat one sees at first is a very faint rod or
pillar of light, but a light with tw o especially peculiar
characteristics. The first is its color. Since one is in fact able
to see the thing, it m ust obviously be either white or
colored. B ut no efforts of m em ory can possibly conjure up
the faintest im age of w hat that color m ight be. H ow it is
possible to have a visual experience that im m ediately after
becom es im possible to rem em ber is difficult to explain, but
so it is. The second cause of confusion is the angle of this
light, or rather the angle of all other things, the objects of
our everyday world, w hen com pared to its perfect verticality. The im pression, however produced, is that an angel
has reference to som e whole system of direction based
outside the earth, and that its m ere presence tem porarily
im poses that alien system on us, abolishing the terrestrial
horizontal. And it appears that the hom ogeneous flame
perceived by our senses is not the body, properly so called,
of the angel, but rather either the sensorium of its body or
the surface of the body that exists after a m anner beyond
our conception in a celestial frame of special references.

I began by defining angels, as "incorporeal intelli
gences." I hastened to add, however, that it would prove
necessary to com plicate that definition and to speak of
angels as in fact having bodies, and as possessing— in spite
of their differences from the matter we ordinarily know —
a corporeal or physical sort o f substance. N ow is the time
for that com plication, and the reason for it should be
apparent from w hat h as since been said. O ne m ust speak
of angels only in this paradoxical way, as incorporeal
corporealities— as spiritual bodies or em bodied spirits —
precisely because they are angels, and angels or angeloi are
by their very nature messengers or ambassadors, as the
Greek original quite clearly attests. They are envoys from
God to men. But men b eing w hat they are, nam ely fallen,
God in His w isdom know s full well that no m essage will
be of the slightest use to them unless it penetrates the
carapace of mental habit and spiritual resistance con
structed by their egos, unless it violates the frontiers and
blurs the distinctions that they have drawn between outer
and inner, natural and supernatural, fact and thought,
body and soul, — unless, in short, it subverts their usual
ways of knowing. H ence the necessity that the messengers
be the m essage and that they be such as to com pel, by their
very presence, a com plete re-evaluation o f all our earthly
categories, and such as to flum m ox our fallen senses, in
order that our thoughts and perceptions might both be
pointed b ack to the w hole from which they w ere broken.

It is thus that when one looks at an angel, the outline of
its body seems to be faintly, sw iftly undulating, as though
the perm anence of its shape, like that of waterfalls or
flam es, co-existed with a rushing m ovem ent of the matter
it contains. W hen one looks straight into the face of such a
being, it appears to be stationary, b u t w henever the eyes
are averted or turned to the side to take in the surround
ings, the angel appears to be flying at an enorm ous speed.
The fact is that such a messenger is alw ays m oving — to
use the uselessness of such language — b ut not in relation
to us. This world, w hich seem s so solid and perm anent, so
fixed and unmoving, is to this being, as it is also to God,
and as it should be to us, a thing in continuous motion,
whose motion is its being. And so, in relation to their own
frame o f spiritual reference, the w orld o f principles, these
celestial creatures m ust appear, in order that they should
at all, to be speeding dow n the universe in order to keep
abreast of the mountains and valleys, the birds and the
trees — all of them in the act o f their com ing to be.

And so it is that to hear an angel speak is to hear a sound
quite astonishingly unlike a voice. It is perfectly articu
late, even beautiful, but undoubtedly inorganic. W e feel
the difference betw een animal voices and all other noises
clearly, though it is hard to define. Blood and lungs and
the warm, m oist cavity of the m outh are som ehow indi
cated in every voice. But in the case of angels, speech is
quite otherwise, sounding rather as if it were played upon

Thus do angles teach us, by the ministry o f their very
presence, the central truths w e stand m ost in need of
knowing: by the im pressions they m ake on the ear and the
eye, and by sim ilar operations too num erous and strange
to mention, and too subtle to define. And it is in this way
that they prepare us for the even m ore im portant and more
disturbing revelation of that O ne in w hom is fused, not just

❖

❖

❖
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mind and matter, but Creator and creation. W hatever it is
that an angel m ight "say ," whatever its particular commu
nications m ight be — to this or that man in this or that
setting — it is in its very substance, in its incorporeal
corporeality, the m ost crucial preliminary revelation of all,
forcing those who witness it to perceive what they think
and to conceive w hat they feel afresh, and so calling them
to fulfill their intended pontifical and redemptive voca
tion.
For it is in fact only then, when my thoughts about light
are themselves made effulgent and my conception of sound
begins to resonate, that I am able to experience and to help
to transmit the world that God intended: a world so packed
with meaning that its very weight must surely crush the
ego that exposes itself unprotected, unarmed with its fallen
distinctions. Only then do I glimpse, dim-glimmering
through the dewy windowpane of the mind I have pre
sumed to m ake mine, the shimmering outlines of Eden, as
the timbre of sound and color o f light are transmuted into
images of their ideas, and matter flows back in the direction
of God like a balloon suddenly emptied of air.
N otes
1. In speaking of angels, I have in mind throughout those beings
whom these authors variously call Ainur (Tolkien), Eldila
(Lewis), and Eidola or Celsitudes (Williams). See The Silmarill
ion, ed. Christopher Tolkien (London: Allen and Unwin,
1977); Perelandra (London: The Bodley Head, 1943); and The
Place of the Lion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978). Though I
shall be stressing only what these creatures have in common, this
is not to suggest that they are equivalent or interchangeable.
2. Tolkien's use of this idea can be found in his essay "On
Fairy-Stories" in Essays Presented to Charles Williams (London:
Oxford University Press, 1947); Lewis makes this distinction
in "Meditation in a Toolshed," published in the collection God
in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970).
3. The allusion here is to a poem by Tolkien, composed initially in
response to a conversation with Lewis and as an aid to the latter's
conversion, and found in the essay "On Fairy-Stories" (71-72):
"Dear Sir," I said —"Although now long estranged,
Man is not wholly lost not wholly changed.
Dis-graced he may be, yet not de-throned,
and keeps the rags of lordship once he owned:
Man, Sub-creator, the refracted Light
through whom is splintered from a single White
to many hues, and endlessly combined
in living shapes that moved from mind to mind.
Though all the crannies of the world we filled
with Elves and Goblins, though we dared to build
Gods and their houses out of dark and light,
and sowed the seed of dragons — 'twas out right
(used or misused). That right has not decayed:
we make still by the law in which we're made."

4. These are the qualities through which the respectivearchetypes
of these various animals makes themselves known in
Williams' The Place of the Lion.
5. What follows in the next three paragraphs is more or less direct
quotations from Chapters One and Sixteen of Lewis'
Perelandra.
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0 1 T T 6 R V l N e — Continued from page 56
rhymes builds character; this vine creates inner strength
which otherwise would rem ain uncultivated. Searching
for truth in fairy tales and nursery rhym es destroys
dreams; it destroys precious bedtim e stories and children's
games. Even M ithridates, a king of Pontus, knew he must
daily drink small doses of poison — pain in life — if he
hoped to survive his enem ies' assassination plot.
The poet, A.E. Houseman, dram atizes this theme in
"Terence, This is Stupid Stuff."
There was a king reigned in the East:
There, when kings will sit to feast,
They get their fill before they think
With poisoned meat and poisoned drink.
He gathered all that springs to birth
From the many-venomed earth;
First a little thence to m ore,
He sampled all her killing store;
And easy, smiling, seasoned sound,
Sate the king w hen healths w ent round.
They put arsenic in his meat
And stared aghast to watch him eat;
They poured strychnine in his cup
And shook to see him drink it up;
They shook, they stared as w hites' their shirt:
Them it was their poison hurt.
— I tell the tale that I heard told.
Mithridates, he died old.
(Perrine 521-522)
The single dose of poison killed M ithridates' enemies.
However, because M ithridates daily drank small doses of
poison, he lived, he coped.
Just as Mithridates dealt with his shattered dream, the
loyalty of his subjects, present society m ust deal with
shattered dreams to cope with reality, the bittersw eet vine.
Destroying these dreams, ingesting past pain, cultivates
the richness within the soul, spiritual strength. Coura
geously facing this bittersw eet vine changes society, singly
and as a whole. W ithout pain, the bitter vine, no inner
strength, the sweet vine, develops. Pain calls society to
change; pain challenges society to act; pain forces society
to cope. P astor present, pain never dies. Only by mirroring
the pain of the past will society, singly and as a whole, cope
with the pain of the present. Fairy tales and nursery
rhymes bless humanity as this challenging m irror — the
bittersw eet vine.
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